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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals turned an argument which
appeared in the law review article, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimi-
nation Litigation,' into law in its landmark decision of Proud v. Stone.2 The authors
of the article asserted that, from the standpoint of a potential discriminator, hiring
members from a class he or she dislikes is irrational.3 As a result, the authors con-
cluded that employers are unlikely to hire individuals from protected classes and
fire them once they begin the job merely because they are members of a protected
1 John J. Donohue and Peter Siegehman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 1017 (1991) (hereinafter "The Changing Nature").
2 945 F.2d 796 (40 Cir. 1991).
See The Changing Nature, supra note 1, at 1017.
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class. 4 Using this reasoning, the Fourth Circuit held that when the same actor both
hires and fires an employee in Age Discrimination in Employment Acte cases
within six months, a powerful inference that discrimination was not a motivating
factor exists.6
The effect of this decision has been the creation of an additional require-
ment for a plaintiff alleging discrimination. Prior to 1991, plaintiffs were only re-
quired to meet the inferential proof scheme established by the United States Su-
preme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.7 McDonnell Douglas estab-
lished that, in discrimination cases, the plaintiff has the burden to prove his or her
prima facie case by showing that: 1) he or she was a member of a protected class;
2) he or she was subjected to an adverse employment action; 3) he or she was
qualified for the position; and 4) the position either remained open or was filled by
a person of similar qualifications.8 After the plaintiff establishes her prima facie
case, an inference of discrimination exists and the defendant is required to establish
that it was motivated by legitimate reasons.9 Finally, after the defendant asserts its
nondiscriminatory reasons for firing or failing to promote the plaintiff, the plaintiff
then has the burden to show that the defendant's reasons are not legal but are mere
pretexts for discrimination. 0
Proud expands this scheme to include an additional requirement for the
plaintiff. After Proud, the plaintiff is not only required to show that the employer's
offered reasons are pretextual, but also that the pretextual reasons are sufficient to
overcome an inference of nondiscrimination when the same individual both hired
and fired the plaintiff. Thus, the Proud decision increases the plaintiffs burden in
proving discriminatory motives under the McDonnell Douglas standard.
The "same actor inference" deserves an examination because of its
unestablished parameters. Currently, courts are divided on its application and sig-
nificance. Some courts have chosen to keep the inference within the boundaries
expressed in the Proud holding, while other courts have expanded the inference to
include almost any discriminatory situation,11 and still other courts have rejected
it.12 Because the application of the "same actor inference" is unsettled, the reason-
ableness and limitations of the inference merit a critical analysis.
4 See id.
5 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 633a (Supp. 1 1995) (hereinafter
"ADEA").
6 See Proud, 945 F.2d at 797.
7 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
8 See id. at 802.
9 See id.
10 See id. at 804.
11 See, e.g., Buhrmaster v. Ovemite Transportation Company, 61 F.3d 461, 464 (6 h Cir. 1995);
Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, 60 F.3d 1126, 1130 (4 h Cir. 1995).
12 See, e.g., Waldron v. SL Indus. Inc., 56 F.3d 491,496 n.6 (3 Cir. 1995).
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This comment focuses on the "same actor inference's" effect on Title VII
individual discrimination lawsuits. In addition, this comment also addresses sum-
mary judgment decisions in favor of employers asserting the "same actor infer-
ence" in Title VII lawsuits. First, Section II serves as an overall introduction into
disparate treatment lawsuits and inferential standards established by the United
States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green and the Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision to supplement the Supreme Court's standard to include the "same
actor inference" expressed in Proud v. Stone. Second, Section III of this comment
investigates post Proud v. Stone rulings where courts have expanded the "same
actor inferince" to include gender, racial discrimination, and national origin law-
suits under Title VII, promotion situations, "business as actor" situations, and situa-
tions where the adverse employment act did not occur within a short time after the
plaintiff's hiring. Third, Section IV discusses the shortcomings of the "same actor
inference," criticizing the misuse of the inference and its application in summary
judgment proceedings. Finally, Section V concludes by asserting that the "same
actor inference" should not be expanded to include any protected groups other than
those specifically articulated by the Proud court and should never be applied to
grant summary judgment where the plaintiff has met the requirements of the
McDonnell Douglas standard.
II. BACKGROUND
A. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
In McDonnell Douglas v. Green, the United States Supreme Court estab-
lished a three-tier burden-shifting standard for plaintiffs claiming individual dispa-
rate treatment discrimination.13 In that case, the plaintiff worked for the defendant
as a mechanic and laboratory technician until he was laid-off.14 The plaintiff, feel-
ing that the layoff was racially motivated because he was African-American and a
vocal activist and supporter of the civil rights movement, initiated a protest in front
of the defendant's plant wherein the plaintiff and other participants blocked access
to the defendant's plant during the morning shift change.15 Thereafter, the plaintiff
applied for a different job and was subsequently denied the position. 16 The district
court dismissed the plaintiff's Title VII Section 70317 claim against the defendant."
Upon examination of the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the standard for assert-
ing a Title VII claim involves a burden-shifting analysis wherein the plaintiff al-
ways bears the burden of persuasion, but the burden of production shifts between
13 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greene, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
14 See id. at 794.
15 See id.
16 See id. at 796.
17 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. I 1996).
18 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 797.
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the plaintiff and the defendant at appropriate times.' 9 Specifically, the court as-
serted that 1) the plaintiff must belong to a protected class; 2) the plaintiff must
have applied for and be qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; 3) the plaintiff must be rejected; and 4) after plaintiff's rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from per-
sons of plaintiffs qualifications. 20 The court then ruled that after the plaintiff estab-
lished his or her prima facie case, the defendant was required to provide a legiti-
mate and nondiscriminatory reason for firing or failing to hire the plaintiff.2 Fi-
nally, after the defendant asserted its nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff was
required to show that the defendant's offered reasons were pretexts for discrimina-
tion.22 Following McDonnell Douglas, courts applied this standard to Title VII
gender and religious discrimination claims, 23 ADEA claims, 24 and Americans
With Disability Act ("ADA") claims.25 Additionally, courts have applied the
McDonnell Douglas standard to cases involving promotion and termination.26
B. Proud v. Stone
In Proud v. Stone, the Fourth Circuit upheld a directed verdict against a
plaintiff in an age discrimination case where the plaintiff met the requirements of
McDonnell Douglas.27 It did so by relying on the "same actor inference" to negate
the inference of discrimination that arises when a plaintiff presents evidence that
meets each of the elements of McDonnell Douglas.28 In Proud, the plaintiff was a
sixty-eight-year-old man who applied for a job with the Department of the Army.29
The individual who hired the plaintiff interviewed him over the telephone but pre-
sumptively knew his age because his date of birth was listed on his application.30
Upon hiring, the plaintiff was asked to assume duties in addition to the duties of the
19 See id. at 802.
20 See id.
21 See id.
22 See id. at 804.
23 See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Conkwright v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933 F.2d 231 (4 h Cir. 1991); L. N. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co., 427
U.S. 273 (1976); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
24 See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
25 See, e.g., Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d. 1319 (10"' Cir. 1997).
26 See, e.g., Aikens v. United States Postal Service, Board of Governors, 642 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Lawton v. State Mutual Life Assurance Company of America, 924 F. Supp. 331 (D. Mass. 1996).
27 See Proud, 945 F.2d at 797-798.
28 See id. at 798.
29 See id. at 796.
30 See id
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job for which he was hired.31 The plaintiff, having no experience with these duties
but in an effort to comply with the request, accepted.32 Afterwards, the plaintiff did
not perform these additional duties efficiently and was, consequently, fired by the
same individual who had hired him six months earlier.33
The issue before the Proud court was whether an employee who is hired
and fired within six months by the same person can prove discrimination under the
ADEA. The court, relying on the law review article, The Changing Nature, 3 de-
termined that, in ADEA cases, when the hirer and firer are the "same individual, a
powerful inference relating to the 'ultimate question' that discrimination did not
motivate the employer" exists.3" Therefore, because the plaintiff was hired by the
same individual who fired him, despite the fact that he was hired over the telephone.
and was given duties in addition to those specified for his job, the court determined
that discrimination was unlikely.3 To support its conclusion, the court relied on
The Changing Nature in stating, "[i]t hardly makes sense to hire workers from a
group one dislikes (thereby incurring the psychological costs of associating with
them), only to fire them once they are on the job."37
To justify its modification of the McDonnell Douglas proof scheme, the
court explained that the "same actor inference" does not violate McDonnell Doug-
las by stating, "[c]ourts must .... resist the temptation to become so entwined in
the intricacies of the proof scheme that they forget that the scheme exists solely to
facilitate determination of 'the ultimate question .... ,,,38 In other words, the court
chose to employ a "bottom-line" analysis,39 but an apparent problem with this justi-
fication is the Supreme Court created the McDonnell Douglas proof scheme to
establish a universal method for determining disparate treatment lawsuits. The
Court did not provide a meaningful justification to transform the "same actor infer-
ence" into law.
This new "same actor inference," as applied by the Fourth Circuit in
Proud, created a higher standard for the plaintiff in a discrimination claim where he
was hired and fired by the same individual. By its analysis, the Fourth Circuit ar-
guably permits the "same actor inference" to override the plaintiff's right to have
the jury decide the case after meeting the McDonnell Douglas proof scheme. The
31 See id.
32 See Proud, 945 F.3d at 796.
33 See id. at 797.
34 See The Changing Nature, supra note 1.
3S Proud, 945 F.2d at 798.
See id. at 797-798.
37 Id. at 797 (quoting The Changing Nature, supra note 1, at 1017).
38 Id. at 798.
39 See id.
1999]
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"same actor inference" has been adopted by the First,40 Second,4 1 Fourth,42 Fifth,43
Sixth," Seventh,45 Eighth46 and Ninth Circuits.47 The Third and Eleventh Circuits
have not adopted the analysis established by the Fourth Circuit giving the same
actor facts a presumptive or mandatory value but have, rather, determined that same
actor facts are merely evidentiary or permissively inferential.48 The Tenth Circuit
has not addressed the same actor issue, though district courts within the circuit have
adopted it. 41
Courts characterize the "same actor inference" in a variety of ways. The
inference is termed a "strong presumption, ' '5° a "presumption,' 5 ' a "powerful infer-
ence,"5 2 a "strong inference, '5 3 a "compelling" inference,
s5 and an "inference. '"5
The "same actor inference" is currently being expanded to include Title VII law-
suits, including gender, race, and national origin, and ADA claims. Given this ex-
pansion of the inference, it warrants a critical analysis addressing the effects on the
newly targeted Title VII groups.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Originally, the "same actor inference" was applied narrowly in its birth
case, Proud v. Stone. Proud specifically held that when the plaintiff was hired and
fired by the same person in ADEA cases and when the plaintiff was hired within
six months of firing, a powerful inference that the employer did not engage in pre-
40 See Jacques v. Clean-Up Group, Inc., 96 F.3d 506, 512 (I' Cir. 1996).
41 nSee Grady v. Affiliated Central, Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 560, (2"" Cir. 1997).
42 See Proud, 945 F.2d at 797.
43 See Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996)
44 See Buhrmaster, 61 F.3d at 463.
45 See EEOC v. Our Lady of the Resurrection Medical Center., 77 F.3d 145, 152 (7"' Cir. 1996).
46 See Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 174-175 (8 t" Cir. 1992)
47 See Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace and Company, 104 F.3d 267,270-271 (91h Cir. 1996).
48 See Waldron, 56 F.3d at 496 n. 6; see also Williams v. Vitro Services Corp., 144 F.3d. 1438,
1442 (11" Cir. 1998).
49 See, e.g., Eslinger v. U.S. Century Credit Union, 866 F. Supp. 491,498-499 (D. Kan. 1994).
50 Tyndall v. National Education Centers, Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 215 (4' Cir. 1994).
51 Brown, 82 F.3d at 658 n.25.
52 Evans v. Technologies Applications & Service Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959 (4' Cir. 1996); Proud, 945
F.2d at 798.
53 Bradley, 104 F.3d at 267, 270-27 1.
54 The Proud court described the inference as having a "compelling nature." Proud, 945 F.2d at 797.
5 Buhrmaster, 61 F.3d at 463; Our Lady of the Resurrection Medical Center, 77 F.3d at 152.
[Vol. 101:565
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textual discrimination existed. Although the court likely intended a broad con-
struction of the "same actor inference" due to language such as "employers who
knowingly hire workers within a protected group seldom will be credible targets of
pretextual firing,"57 this language is dicta and can be narrowly construed. More-
over, the essential problem with the Proud court's reasoning, and, perhaps, the
cause of subsequent expansive application of the "same actor inference," is the
Proud court applies the "same actor inference" while assuming that the plaintiff has
provided evidence that the reason given for his or her discharge was pretextual. To
further complicate its analysis, the court fails to discuss when a plaintiffs proof of
pretext will overcome the inference.58 As a result, no standard exists to protect
plaintiffs who provide legitimate and believable pretextual reasons for discrimina-
tion.
Since the decision, courts have aggressively expanded the holding in
Proud. Recent developments in same actor cases have proven that the inference can
be applied in almost any lawsuit where the adverse actor hired and allegedly dis-
criminated against the plaintiff.
A. The Expansion of the "Same Actor Inference" to Include All Protected
Classes and the Elimination of the Time Requirement Expressed in Proud
1. Gender Discrimination and Time Requirement
Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transportation Company59 expanded the Proud
decision to cover gender discrimination and situations where the plaintiff was not
terminated within a short time of hiring. 60 In Buhrmaster, a female office manager
sued her former employer under Title VII alleging discrimination based upon sex.61
Buhrmaster was initially hired as a Customer Service Representative in 1984, a
relatively low-level position, and was eventually promoted to Office Manager in
1989 by the same manager who hired her in 1984.62 The Office Manager position
placed Buhrmaster as second in command at the Overnite Dayton Terminal and
5 See Proud, 945 F.2d at 797.
57 Id. at 798.
58 The court states,
[w]hile we can imagine egregious facts from which a discharge in this context [same
actor context] could still be proven to have been discriminatory, it is unlikely that the
compelling nature of the inference arising from facts such as these will make cases in-
volving this situation amenable to resolution at an early stage.
Id. at 797 (alteration in original). Even so, the court does not explain this exception in its analysis.
59 61 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 1995).
60 See id. at 463-464; Lococo v. Barger, 958 F. Supp. 290, 297 (E.D. Ky. 1997).
61 See Buhrmaster, 61 F.3d at 462.
62 See id.
1999]
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gave her significant power supervising lower-level employees.63 Buhrmaster was
the only woman at the terminal with significant authority. "4 Moreover, throughout
her career at Ovemite, Buhrmaster was repeatedly complimented on her diligence
as an employee.65 Despite her obvious diligence, Buhrmaster may have used a
management style that her subordinates did not appreciate.66 According to the com-
pany, as a result of complaints regarding her "style," Buhrmaster was fired from
her position by the same person who had hired her several years earlier without any
notice of the complaints.67
On an appeal questioning the validity of "same actor inference" jury in-
structions, the Sixth Circuit adopted the Proud analysis and expanded it to include
sex discrimination. The court did not discuss the possibility that the plaintiff's
management style may have been bothersome to her subordinates because she was
a woman with significant authority. Moreover, the court did not address that the
individual who fired Buhrmaster did so because of these complaints. Rather, the
court simply affirmed the lower court's expansion of the Proud holding by stating
that "[a]n individual who is willing to hire and promote a person of a certain class
is unlikely to fire them simply because they are a member of that class" and "[t]his
general principle applies regardless of whether the class is age, race, sex, or some
other protected classification." 68 Furthermore, the court stated that "a short period
of time is not an essential element of the 'same actor inference."' 6 9 Thus, the court
expanded the "same actor inference" in two directions. Specifically, the court ex-
panded the "same actor inference" to include sex discrimination while it eliminated
the short time period requirement. 0
2. Race and National Origin Discrimination
Jiminez v. Mary Washington College expanded the Proud holding to race
and national origin discrimination cases. 71 In Jiminez, the plaintiff was a black pro-
fessor from the West Indies.72 The plaintiff was hired by Mary Washington College
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See id.
66 See Buhrmaster, 61 F.3d at 462.
67 See id.
68 Id. at 464.
69 Id.
70 Since the Buhrmaster decision, the "same actor inference" has been used in several Title VII
cases, including Amirmokri, 60 F.3d at 1130 (national origin), and Jiminez v. Mary Washington College, 57
F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 1995) (race and national origin).
71 See Jiminez, 57 F.3d at 378; see also Our Lady of the Resurrection Medical Center, 77 F.3d at
152.
72 See Jiminez, 57 F.3d at 369.
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("MWC") as a tenure-track professor.73 Part of the determination of tenure relied
upon student evaluations of each professor's competence and teaching ability.
74
Initially, Jiminez received low evaluations from his students during his first five
semesters of teaching7 5 Thereafter,. his evaluations increased to an acceptable
level.76 Several students wrote letters to the college and testified before the court
that the majority of Jiminez's negative evaluations arose from racial intolerance by
Jiminez's students r These students asserted that a conspiracy to keep Jiminez
from tenure existed because, during the evaluation periods, several students would
gather together and discuss how they could give him negative evaluations while
making fun of his nationality and accent.7 In addition, these students testified that
Jiminez was not afforded the same respect usually given to white professors.79
The district court determined that Jiminez had sufficiently proven that the
defendant's asserted reasons for terminating him were pretextual.80 The defendant
asserted that it did not grant the plaintiff tenure because he consistently received
poor student evaluations, he produced no scholarly work, and he failed to obtain his
Ph.D.81 Jiminez then asserted that these reasons were pretextual because the defen-
dant knowingly relied upon the tainted student evaluations and gave tenure to other
professors who had not received their Ph.D.82 "The district court concluded that the
more favorable student evaluations Jiminez received during his sixth, seventh, and
eighth semesters at MWC constituted proof that his student evaluations for the first
five semesters were tainted by the collusive effort of some white students."83 Con-
sequently, the court ruled in Jiminez's favor. 4
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the facts of the case and deter-
mined that the district court should have granted the defendant judgment as a mat-
ter of law based on the "same actor inference" 85 and the Proud "bottom-line" dis-
crimination analysis.8 The court noted that the district court misapplied the
73 See id. at 372.
74 See id. at 373.
75 See id. at 373-375.
76 See id. at 375.
77 See Jiminez, 57 F.3d at 373-375.
78 See id.
79 See id. at 374.
80 See id. at 379-380.
81 See id. at 376.
82 See Jiminez, 57 F.3d at 376.
8 Id. at 379-380.
84 See id. at 372.
85 See id. at 378.
86 See Proud, 945 F.2d at 798.
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McDonnell Douglas standard because the Fourth Circuit had previously ruled in its
1991 Proud decision that same actor facts "create[] a strong inference that the em-
ployer's stated reason for acting against the employee is not pretextual.... In short,
employers who knowingly hire workers within a protected group seldom will be
credible targets for charges of pretextual firing., 87 As a result, Jiminez lost his case
on appeal. 88
B. The Expansion of the "Same Actor Inference" to Include "Business As
Actor" Situations
Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company radically and most no-
tably expanded the "same actor inference" established in Proud by expanding it to
include "business as actor" situations. 89 In Amirmokri, the plaintiff was an Iranian
immigrant who was allegedly promised a Senior Engineering position at the defen-
dant's business within six months of hiring."0 Upon hiring, the plaintiff was sys-
tematically harassed at his job.91 Specifically, he was harassed by the leader of his
engineering work group.92 This supervisor aggressively harassed the plaintiff by
using ethnic slurs such as "local terrorist," "camel jockey," "the ayatollah" and "the
Emir of Waldorf., 93 Not surprisingly, the plaintiff did not receive the Senior Engi-
neering position when it became available five months later.' Instead, the defen-
dant chose to promote another applicant with better performance ratings95 than the
plaintiff but fewer qualifications, including the lack of an engineering degree.9s
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant. On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit radically expanded the "same actor inference." The court stated
that "BG&E [the defendant] was aware of Amirmokri's Iranian descent just five
months earlier when it hired him and allegedly promised him a promotion, making
it especially unlikely that he was denied a promotion because of bias against his
national origin."97 In its opinion, the court overlooked the fact that the plaintiff's
87 Id. (alteration in original). Again, the court relies on The Changing Nature in its opinion. In this
article, the authors assert that, from the standpoint of the discriminator, hiring employees from groups that
one dislikes is irrational. See The Changing Nature, supra note 1, at 1017.
88 See Jiminez, 57 F.3d at 384.
89 See Amirmokri, 60 F.3d. at 1130.
90 See id. at 1128-1129.
91 See id. at 1129.
92 See id.
Id.
94 See Amirmokri, 60 F.3d at 1129.
95 It is important to note that the same supervisor who harassed the plaintiff by using ethnic slurs was
also the supervisor who evaluated Amirmokri's performance. See id.
96 See id. at 1130.
Id.
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performance ratings could have been affected by his group leader's prejudice
against Iranians. Instead, the court chose to expand the "same actor inference" by
applying it to a business entity without regard to the fact that the individual who
actually hired the plaintiff was not involved in firing him. Thus, according to
Amirmokri, the "same actor inference" can apply not only when an employee is
fired by the same person who hired him or her, but also when the employee is fired
by the same business entity that hired him or her. Obviously, an employee is usu-
ally hired by the same business entity that fired him or her. Furthermore, it is hard
to even imagine or to hypothesize a situation, less a company merger or acquisition,
when an employee will not be both hired and fired by the same business entity. In
short, this case may provide employers an argument that they did not fire or fail to
promote an employee for discriminatory reasons merely because they hired that
employee. In the face of this argument, a plaintiff is likely to have a challenging
battle prevailing in a discrimination lawsuit in the Fourth Circuit.98
a
C. Outcomes of the Recent Cases
These recent cases suggest as many questions as they answer. The rapid
expansion of the "same actor inference" to apply to all protected groups, to promo-
tion situations,99 to situations where the time period between hiring and the adverse
employment act is not brief, and to business entities as "actors" creates questions
because no boundaries appear to exist. For instance, under these new developments
a defendant can legitimately argue that because it hired a minority or woman into
an entry-level position several years earlier, an inference and presumption of non-
discrimination exists when it fails to promote her to a higher-level position.
Clearly, this analysis demonstrates a misunderstanding about the role that stereo-
types and prejudice play in the workplace.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The "Same Actor Inference" Is Unreasonable When Minorities and
Women Are Asserting Disparate Treatment Claims
Many explanations exist to rebut the logic and reasoning utilized by the au-
thors of The Changing Nature and the Proud decision. The article and the cases
purport to be based on a "common sense" notion that management will not hire
someone against whom it is prejudiced. Thus, the authors and the courts suggest
that the mere hiring of an individual demonstrates that management is not preju-
diced when it later fires the individual. This analysis displays a lack of understand-
ing about the manner in which prejudice and stereotypes actually affect decision-
98 The Fourth Circuit's reasoning is likely to be accepted by other circuits judging by the swift ac-
ceptance of the Proud reasoning.
99 See Amirmokri, 60 F.3d at 1130.
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making in the workplace. Further, several explanations such as grooming,' oo out-
side influences,'01  circumstantial changes and attitudes,10 2 and, most important,
discriminatory stereotyping' 03 rebut this suggestion. Simply stated, the "same actor
inference" is a misguided assumption. This is especially true given the fact that the
authors of The Changing Nature conceded that it was originally based on little or
no empirical findings. 04 Unfortunately, that concession was ignored by the Fourth
Circuit and the majority of circuits that support the "same actor inference."
First, a few courts have discussed the possibility of grooming in situations
where an employee is hired and terminated within a brief time.105 These courts have
agreed that a jury can reasonably conclude that employees from protected classes
who are qualified for the position at issue may be hired merely to act as a
"groomer" or trainer for another individual that the employer prefers from an un-
protected class.' 6 That is, the protected individual was merely hired or promoted to
train an unprotected employee. Second, as shown in Jimenez'0 7 and Amirmokri,'0o
outside influences can greatly influence the decision-maker's judgment. Thus, the
individual actors who actually hired the plaintiffs may not be acting with discrimi-
natory intent but are, instead, influenced by subordinates, coworkers, and superiors
who evaluated the plaintiffs such as the students'09 and supervisors" 0 illustrated in
100 See Waldron, 56 F.3d at 496 n.6.
101 See Amirmokri, 60 F.3d at 1129 (involving lack of promotion based on performance evaluations
prepared by racist supervisor).
102 See International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 188 (1991) (involving discrimination based upon fertility); Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543 (1971) (involving emerging discrimination of female employees
who have pre-school aged children).
103 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234,235 (1989).
104 See Julie S. Northup, Note & Comment, The "Same Actor Inference" in Employment Discrimina-
tion: Cheap Justice?, 73 WASH. L. REv. 193, 213 n.146 (1998).
105 See Johnson v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 994 F.2d. 543, 548 (81h Cir. 1993) (acknowledging likeli-
ness that age protected plaintiff was hired to groom a younger employee); Waldron, 56 F.3d at 496 n.6; see
also Northup, supra note 104, at 210.
106 For example, the Waldron court accepted the EEOC position that an employer may hire an older
employee to simply "use his skills for a few years while a younger person [is] being 'groomed' for his posi-
tion" and, essentially, fire the individual because of his age. Waldron, 56 F.3d at 496 n.6 (alteration in origi-
nal).
107 To illustrate, the district judge in Jiminez reasoned that the college discriminated against Jiminez
by relying on student evaluations that were "tainted by collusion and racial and national origin animus"in its
tenure decisions. Jiminez, 57 F.3d at 376. Therefore, it is clear that individuals who are not directly involved
in employment decisions may influence a decision-maker.
108 In Amirmokri, the plaintiff was racially harassed by a supervisor who evaluated his performance;
thus, although the actual decision-makers may not have intended to discriminate, they utilized the evaluations
made by a supervisor who racially harassed the plaintiff while making the promotion decision. See generally
Amirmokri, 60 F.3d at 1129.
109 See Jiminez, 57 F.3d at 372-376.
110 See Amirmokri, 60 F.3d at 1129-1130.
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the example cases. Third, many situations exist where emerging discriminatory
attitudes begin after the plaintiff is employed. For instance, an employer's opinion
of the plaintiff may change when new factors emerge such as marriage, pregnancy,
and child-rearing.111 Finally, a possibility always exists that an employee may be
adversely affected due to employer advocated stereotypes and prejudices. 1 2 In this
situation, employers may not have an aversion toward women and minorities as
long as they continue to work in stereotypical or traditional jobs. These employers
may be perfectly willing to hire a woman or minority but unwilling to promote
women and minorities into nontraditional and more responsible positions within the
company. Indeed, they may intend to keep women and minorities in entry-level
positions. 1 3 They may also hold women and minorities to a higher standard based
upon stereotypes or be quick to criticize minorities and women on the job due to
their prejudices and stereotypes.
The courts' decision to expand the "same actor inference" to include Title
VII classes is particularly troublesome when considering all of the menacing
stereotypes that plague women and minorities. It is difficult to understand how the
courts could overlook the inference's obvious negative implications in discrimina-
tion lawsuits based upon stereotypes. Certainly, the court cannot deny that dis-
crimination based upon stereotypes exists;" 4 therefore, presuming a nondiscrimina-
tory motive based merely on the fact that a business entity or an individual hired a
woman or a minority employee is clearly erroneous." 5
To illustrate the shortcomings of the "same actor inference," consider the
See Eslinger, 866 F. Supp. at 494; Mentch v. East Savings Bank, 949 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (D. Md.
1997) (lack of promotion because of pregnancy); see generally Tracy L. Bach, Note, Gender Stereotyping in
Employment Discrimination: Finding a Balance of Evidence and Causation Under Title VII, 77 MINN. L.
REv. 1251 (1993).
112 For example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently stated:
[t]he psychological assumption underlying the same-actor inference may not hold true
on the facts of the particular case. For example, a manager might hire a person of a
certain race expecting them not to rise to a position in the company where daily con-
tact with the manager would be necessary. Or an employer might hire an employee of
a certain gender expecting that person to act, or dress, or talk in a way the employer
deems acceptable for that gender and then fire that employee if she fails to comply
with the employer's gender stereotypes. Similarly, if an employee were the first Afri-
can-American hired, an employer might be unaware of his own stereotypical views of
African-Americans at the time of hiring. If the employer subsequently discovers he
does not wish to work with African-Americans and fires the newly hired employee for
this reason, the employee would still have a claim of racial discrimination despite the
same-actor inference.
Johnson v. Zema Systems Corp., 170 F.3d 730, 745 (7 h Cir. 1999).
113 See generally Ramona L. Paetzold and Rafael Gelu, Through the Looking Glass: Can Title VII
Help Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31 Hous. L. REv. 1517 (1995); Mary K. O'Melveny,
Playing the "Gender" Card: Affirmative Action and Working Women, 84 KY. L. J. 863 (1995-1996).
114 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)(ruling that employer stereotypes were motivat-
ing factors behind plaintiff's lack of promotion).
115 See Julie S. Northup, supra note 104; see, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228.
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Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins decision in 1989.116 In Price Waterhouse, the Su-
preme Court ruled that stereotypes based upon gender are discriminatory under
Title VII when the stereotypes serve as "motivating factors" in the employer's
promotion decisions. 17 In Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff sued for discrimination
evidenced by lack of promotion.118 Instead of promoting the plaintiff based on her
excellent performance in securing multimillion dollar contracts and excellent client
rapport, Price Waterhouse managers placed Hopkins' application on hold and ad-
vised her to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." 119 In addition, Price man-
agers accused Hopkins of being "overly aggressive" and "unduly harsh" even
though these traits were not issues for male employees and associates.120 Unques-
tionably, Price Waterhouse created different rules of professionalism based on gen-
der, specifically based on gender stereotypes. Indeed, the stereotypes advocated by
Price Waterhouse harm "women by restricting workplace opportunities, inhibiting
opportunity for career advancement, and limiting earning power. 1 21
Price Waterhouse was obviously decided before the Proud decision in
1991. Therefore, applying the facts of Price Waterhouse to a "same actor infer-
ence" analysis illustrates the unreasonableness of expanding it to include Title VII
classes. Because Price Waterhouse was a disparate treatment case that involved
discriminatory promotional decisions based upon sex, the McDonnell Douglas
proof scheme 122 and the "same actor inference" from Proud v. Stone can apply.123
Using the McDonnell Douglas standard, Hopkins could establish her prima
facie case by showing that she was a member of a protected class, applied for and
was qualified for a promotion, was denied the promotion, and the employer pro-
moted another person of similar qualifications. 24 Next, Price Waterhouse would
assert that it did not promote Hopkins because of nondiscriminatory factors such as
the fact that she was "overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with and
impatient with staff.' 25 Thereafter, Hopkins would assert that she was not pro-
moted because of discrimination based upon stereotypical notions of womanhood.
116 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
117 See id. at 250.
118 See id. at 232.
119 Id. at 235 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985)).
120 Id. (quoting Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1113).
121 Tracy L. Bach, Note, Gender Stereotyping in Employment Discrimination: Finding a Balance of
Evidence and Causation Under Title VII, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1251, 1254 (1993).
122 In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court lowered the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting frame-
work by shifting the burden of persuasion to the employer after the plaintiff established direct acts of dis-
crimination. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 230, Syl. Pt. b.
123 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792; Proud, 945 F.2d. 796.
124 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
125 Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1113.
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She would particularly note that key decision-makers found her to be "macho" and
in need of a "course at charm school. '125 Yet under the same actor analysis, Hop-
kins would probably be denied the opportunity to argue her case before a jury. 127 In
fact, using the analysis of the Amirmokri court, 128 some federal courts might con-
clude that, because Price Waterhouse hired Hopkins in the past, it is unlikely that it
discriminated against her when it failed to offer her a partnership. In fact, the court
may be as extreme as the Fifth Circuit in Brown v. CSC Logic Inc.129 In Brown, the
court ruled that age-related comments such as "old goat' 130 were "not sufficiently
egregious to overcome the inference that [the defendant's] stated reason for dis-
charging [the plaintiff] was not pretext for age discrimination.'' Using this analy-
sis, the Price Waterhouse managers and supervisors can make discriminatory re-
marks to Hopkins without worrying about their reasons being labeled pretextual
unless those remarks constitute sufficiently egregious remarks. Because statements
such as "old goat" are as equally offensive as statements such as "wear makeup,"
Price Waterhouse's gender related statements are, arguably, not sufficiently egre-
gious to overcome the "same actor inference." The final outcome is Price Water-
house could effectively defend its discriminatory actions against Hopkins by assert-
ing the "same actor inference" despite all the discriminatory statements its agents
made to her regarding her employment and possibility for advancement.
To fully appreciate the deficiencies of the same actor analysis, the role of
stereotypes in the workplace as they affect women and minorities must be consid-
ered. Women and minorities typically reach the glass ceiling significantly earlier
than white men of similar qualifications. 32 For example, although white men con-
sist of about forty-seven percent of the total work force and only forty-eight percent
of the college degree work force, they still control the majority of the top employ-
ment positions. 33 Additionally, even though "women are over half of the adult
population and nearly half of the workforce, most continue to work in traditionally
'female' jobs such as teachers, nurses, clerical workers, and librarians.' 34 Further-
more, women still compose the extreme minority in nontraditional jobs' 35 such as
the position of partner at Price Waterhouse. In summary, statistical proof shows
126 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
127 This is because the "same actor inference" is applied extensively in summary judgment proceed-
ings.
128 See Amirokri, 60 F.3d at 1130.
129 Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651 (5" Cir. 1996).
130 Id. at 656.
131 Id. at 658 (alteration in original).
132 See generally Ramona L. Paetzold and Rafael Gelu, Through the Looking Glass: Can Title VII
Help Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31 HOus. L. REV. 1517 (1995).
133 See O'Melveny, supra note 113, at 893.
134 O'Melveny, supra note 113, at 893.
135 See O'Melveny, supra note 113, at 893.
1999]
15
Taylor: The Same Actor Inference: A Mechanism for Employment Discriminati
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1999
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
that disparities exist in the percentages of women and minorities in nontraditional
positions. This is so despite the fact that white men are the minority of college
graduates. These disparities have been proven to be statistically significant in their
relationships to stereotypes held by whites and men.13 Therefore, no court should
even assume that an employer who hires women and minorities will not discrimi-
nate against those individuals in later employment decisions. This assumption de-
fies reality given the volume of Title VII case law 137 and statistical research show-
ing otherwise.
The Proud court supports application of the "same actor inference" by a
policy argument that ignores the reality of prejudice in the workplace. The court
states that allowing employees to bring discrimination claims against an employer
when the same actor both hired and fired the employee is unduly burdensome to the
employer and will create the "risk that employers who otherwise would have no
bias against older workers [would] now refuse to hire them in order to avoid merit-
less but costly ADEA actions. 138 Thus, the court rationalizes its decision by assert-
ing that, because plaintiffs are less likely to claim discrimination in hiring and em-
ployers are aware of this, permitting plaintiffs to claim discrimination in firing un-
der same actor facts will cause employers to discriminate in hiring. This reasoning
ignores the fact that discrimination against protected classes is illegal in both situa-
tions. In the end, the court really offers no compelling policy reason in transform-
ing the "same actor inference" from a premise in a law review article into law in
Proud.
B. The "Same Actor Inference" Should Be Afforded the Evidentiary Standard
Allowed by the Third Circuit or, Alternatively, Should Be Narrowly Con-
strued
Originally, the "same actor inference" was applied narrowly. In fact, the
Proud court appeared to require four elements to apply the "same actor inference."
The Proud holding states that an inference of nondiscrimination exists in 1) ADEA
cases when 2) the plaintiff is hired and fired 3) by the same individual 4) within six
months of hiring. 139 Although the "same actor inference" in any discrimination
situation has serious weaknesses, the Proud holding keeps the inference within
136 See generally Joseph Tomkiewicz and O.C. Brenner, The Impact of Perceptions and Stereotypes
on the Managerial Mobility of African Americans, JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, February, 1998 (statis-
tically proving a significant relationship between race stereotypes and the perceived requisite personal charac-
teristics for management positions); V.E. Schein, The Relationship Between Sex Role Stereotypes and Requi-
site Management Characteristics, JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. 57, 1973, at 95-100 (male mana-
gerial stereotypes have negative effects on women's career opportunities in management); Tracy Anbinder
Baron, Comment, Keeping Women Out of the Executive Suite: The Court's Failure to Apply Title VII Scrutiny
to Upper-Level Jobs, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 267 (1994).
137 Several cases show that, despite same actor facts, discrimination does occur. See e.g., Haun v.
Ideal Industries, Inc. 81 F.3d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1996); Thurman v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 90 F.3d
1160, 1168 (6'h Cir. 1994).
138 Proud, 945 F.2d at 797 (alteration in original).
139 Id.
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reasonable limits by outlining four elements in its holding. Moreover, it does not
apply to promotion decisions or adopt the "business as actor" language. Most im-
portant, a narrow reading of Proud limits the "same actor inference" to ADEA
cases while protecting Title VII classes. In essence, the courts' broad readings of
Proud are the essential problem because they have lead to misapplication.
The Third Circuit was the first circuit to reject the Proud analysis. In Wal-
dron v. SL Industries, Inc.,140 the Third Circuit rejected giving same actor facts an
inferential value and, instead, granted them an evidentiary value.141 In Waldron, the
defendant hired the plaintiff when he was sixty-one years old. 142 Two years later,
the defendant reorganized its company and divided the plaintiffs position into two
different positions. It, then, hired a younger man to fill one of these positions
while the plaintiff was informed that he would not be considered for the remaining
position.144 The other position remained open. Thereafter, the two positions were
combined into the one position that the plaintiff previously occupied, and the
younger employee received the other half of the plaintiffs job. 45 In the end, the
younger person received the plaintiff s job in its entirety.146 The defendant argued
that the Third Circuit should apply the "same actor inference" from Proud.147 In-
stead, the Third Circuit affirmed the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion's position that same actor facts are merely evidentiary at trial and should not
be given a presumptive value. 148 Because it used the term "presumptive," the Third
Circuit likely recognized that the "same actor inference" was not really "inference"
at all but, instead, a presumption. 149
A similar analysis was established by the Eleventh Circuit in Williams v.
Vitro Services Corp. 10 The plaintiff in Williams was rehired by the defendant when
he was forty-nine years old.' 51 When the defendant was unable to receive a particu-
140 56 F.3d 491.
141 See id. at 496 n.6.
142 See id. at 493.
143 See id.
144 See id at 493.
145 See Waldron, 56 F.3d at 493.
146 See id.
147 See id. at 496 n.6.
148 See id.
149 Many courts appear to treat the "same actor inference" as a presumption. For example, the Brown
court analyzed that evidence of discrimination must be "egregious" to overcome the "same actor inference."
Brown, 82 F.3d at 658. Some courts even refer to the "same actor inference" as a "presumption." See e.g.,
Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Group, Inc., A Division of Leggett & Platt, Inc., 129 F.3d 391, 399 (71h Cir.
1997). At any rate, the "inference" is dispositive because it generally means that the case will have a pro-
employer outcome. See Northup, supra note 104, at 206.
150 144 F.3d 1438.
151 See id. at 1440.
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lar contract, it offered the plaintiff a severance package which he did not accept."5 2
Thereafter, the same individual who had previously hired him earlier terminated his
employment. 53 The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant.' 4
On appeal, the defendant asked the court to conclude a "lack of discriminatory mo-
tive ... based on the fact that the same actor was involved in the decision to hire,
promote, and terminate Williams."' 55 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant's
argument and, instead, ruled that, because of the burden-shifting nature of dis-
crimination lawsuits, the "same actor inference" is "a permissible-not a manda-
tory-inference that a jury may make in deciding whether intentional discrimination
motivated the employer's conduct."'*s Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
same actor facts may be relevant, but they lead to a permissible inference at thejury's discretion.15 7 This language is clearly less restrictive than the Proud "power-
ful inference" and "compelling inference" language.
In contrast to the decisions of the Third Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit,
most circuits quickly accepted and expanded the Proud holding. 5 8 Post-Proud case
law reveals that a current standard for the use of the "same actor inference" no
longer resembles the Proud holding. Today, an expansive reading of the law is that
a powerful presumption, presumption, powerful inference, compelling inference, or
inference' 59 of nondiscrimination exists in 1) all discrimination cases where 2) the
plaintiff was hired and fired or hired and not promoted 3) by the business entity or
the same individual who hired the plaintiff 4) at any time in the past.160 Unques-
tionably, this extended standard usurps the entire purpose of Title VII to combat
discrimination in the workplace based on race, gender, national origin, and religion.
Obviously, a plaintiff will be suing the same business entity that hired her. Fur-
thermore, unless the courts incorrectly interpret Title VII to only protect individuals
in discriminatory hiring cases, the new standard seems irrational. Hence, the courts
have expanded the "same actor inference" to unreasonable levels.
To protect Title VII groups from the extreme application of the doctrine,
courts should follow the limited analysis of the Third Circuit or the Eleventh Cir-
cuit. These courts assert that same actor facts are relevant as evidence or as a per-
152 See id.
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 Williams, 144 F.3d at 1442.
156 Id. at 1443.
157 See id.
158 See Grady, 130 F.3d at 560; Brown, 82 F.3d at 658; Buhrmaster, 61 F.3d at 463; Our Lady of the
Resurrection Medical Center, 77 F.3d at 152; Lowe, 963 F.2d at 174-175; Bradley, 104 F.3d at 270-271;
Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 215; Evans, 80 F.3d at 959.
159 See Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 215.
160 See Buhrmaster, 61 F.3d at 464.
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missible inference at trial but should be left for the jury to weigh in its verdict.''
The cases allow the defendant to argue the "same actor inference" to the trier of
fact while allowing the plaintiff to argue why, in the particular case, the inference is
not persuasive. This approach allows the plaintiff and the defendant the opportunity
to make reasonable arguments before the trier of fact. Furthermore, these analyses
protect plaintiffs from summary judgment based on same actor facts.
C. The "Same Actor Inference" Should Not Be Employed in Summary Judg-
ment Proceedings
Most circuit courts have shown through their rulings that the "same actor
inference" is not only an inference or presumption of nondiscrimination, but also a
dispositive factor that allows employers to avoid liability in discrimination cases by
obtaining summary judgment. In response, courts should not use the "same actor
inference" in summary judgment proceedings because doing so ignores the spirit of
the rule of summary judgment. If a party can show that there is no "genuine issue
as to any material fact" in a lawsuit, then the party is "entitled to judgement as a
matter of law.' ' 162 Additionally, the court is required to view all of the facts in favor
163 i tof the nonmoving party. Only in this situation is summary judgment appropriate.
To explain the McDonnell Douglas standard's affect on summary judg-
ment, the Third Circuit stated in Fuentes v. Perskie'64 that after a plaintiff estab-
lishes her prima facie discrimination case, she may defeat a motion for summary
judgment by 1) discrediting the defendant's reasons for the adverse employment
decision, either circumstantially or directly or 2) introducing direct or circumstan-
tial evidence that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determi-
native cause of the adverse employment decision.65 This approach to summary
judgment advances the spirit of the McDonnell Douglas decision because it gives
significant merit to a plaintiff's ability to prove pretext. Originally, once the plain-
tiff offered evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that the employer's
reason for termination was pretextual, the plaintiff was protected from summary
judgment.'6 6 That is, once the plaintiff made reasonable assertions that the defen-
dant's legitimate reasons were actually pretextual, then determining factual infer-
ences would be made by a jury instead of a judge in a summary judgment proceed-
ing.167
Since its birth in Proud, the "same actor inference" has consistently been
161 See Waldron, 56 F.3d at 496 n.6; Williams, 144 F.3d. at 1443.
162 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
163 See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
164 32 F.3d 759 (3rd Cir. 1994).
165 See id. at 764.
166 See Waldron, 56 F. 3d at 495.
167 See, e.g., Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.
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used in summary judgment proceedings. 16 8 In fact, a policy argument in Proud
encourages courts to utilize the inference in summary judgment proceedings. Spe-
cifically, Proud states "[i]f former employees in these [same actor] situations bring
ADEA claims that are allowed to proceed to trial, employers may fear that a costly
suit is possible even when there are completely legitimate reasons for a dis-
charge.,169 After the Proud decision, courts have earnestly made sure that employ-
ers no longer have this fear.
A brief overview of the cases involving the "same actor inference" leaves
an impression that employees do not have a bright future when their adverse em-
ployment decision was made by the same person who hired them. Indeed, more
than three-fourths of the cases using the "same actor inference" had pro-employer
decisions and nearly two thirds of the decisions resulted in summary judgment de-
cisions in favor of the employer.170 Hence, employers should have no fear when
they are sued for discrimination under same actor facts while plaintiffs should be
prepared to lose their case.
In addition, the "same actor inference" should not be used in motions for
summary judgment because it ignores the proper role of the judge and jury. In
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., the United States Supreme Court specifically cau-
tioned the trial court to refrain from making evidentiary determinations and inferen-
tial determinations based upon the facts. 171 The court noted that those functions are
within the province of the jury.172 In addition, the Diebold court established that all
factual determinations should be made in favor of the nonmoving party.173 Without
question, when the court uses the "same actor inference" to crush a plaintiff's proof
of pretext, it is not making factual determination in favor of the nonmoving party.
Most important, the Anderson court went further to state that the court should draw
reasonable inferences against the moving party while granting the jury the power to
make factual determinations. 174
V. CONCLUSION
Because employment discrimination cases rarely involve "smoking-guns,"
the "same actor inference" should not expand the McDonnell Douglas standard.
Moreover, it should not be expanded to include Title VII protected classes, promo-
tion situations, situations where the adverse employment act did not occur within a
brief period of plaintiff's hiring, and situations where the actor is not the individual
168 See Julie S. Northup, supra note 104, at 207.
169 Proud, 945 F.2d at 798 (alteration in original).
170 See Julie S. Northup, supra note 104, at 207-08.
171 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
172 See id. at 255.
173 See Diebold, 369 U.S. at 655.
174 See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
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who directly hired the plaintiff. Furthermore, the inference should never be used in
summary judgment proceedings because it should be evidence available to the jury
instead of a dispositive factor. The "same actor inference" ignores the common
employment experiences of minorities and women. Because of serious inconsisten-
cies in the reasoning of the inference, courts should either abandon it completely or
recognize that it is only an inference and narrowly apply it.
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